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ABSTRACT
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) has
reached an all-time high. FCPA violations can result in many
significant costs, both monetary and non-monetary. FCPA
compliance has become a top corporate governance issue and has
triggered shareholder litigation, tax investigations, and money
laundering probes. While many corporate managers, financial
officers, board members, internal and external auditors, and forensic
accountants are aware of the FCPA’s basic objectives and mandates,
many may not do an adequate job of protecting their firms and/or
clients from the dangerous consequences that can result from FCPA
non-compliance. The purposes of this paper are to: (1) analyze and
describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions, payments
(bribes), and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and
analyze the important provisions of the FCPA; and (3) make
recommendations to help firms improve their compliance with the
FCPA.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2010, BAE Systems reached settlements with the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the United Kingdom Serious Fraud
Office totaling $450 million.1 The settlements involved an alleged
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)2 in connection

1. Steven Tyrell, DOJ Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggressive FCPA
Enforcement Environment, WEIL GOTSHALL & MANGES LLP BRIEFING (Feb. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725.
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3,
78ff (2006)), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3,
78ff (2006) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2006)).
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with the sale of a radar system to Tanzania.3 In January 2010, the DOJ
arrested 22 employees and executives of firms in the military products
industry.4 They were indicted on charges of bribing government officials
in an African country to obtain a presidential guard business.5 In April
of 2010, Charles Jumet of Virginia was “sentenced to 87 months in
prison for paying bribes to former Panamanian government officials to
secure maritime contracts.”6 In May of 2011, “a jury convicted Lindsey
Manufacturing Co., two of its executives, and a Mexican sales agent in a
bribery case.”7 This marked the first time a company has been convicted
at trial for violations of the FCPA.8
In 2000, there was one FCPA case pursued by the federal
government. In 2009, there were 67 cases filed by the DOJ and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) (see Table 1). These
facts highlight the growing priority given to FCPA enforcement by the
DOJ and the SEC. The Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer,
insists that aggressive prosecution of the FCPA “should make clear to
every corporate executive, every board member, and every sales agent
that [the DOJ] will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA
violations.”9 “The increase in FCPA prosecutions over the past several
years can be attributed to an increase in voluntary reporting by
corporations . . . increased international law enforcement cooperation, . .
. a renewed focus on internal controls, the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement

3. Press Release, BAE Sys., BAE Sys. PLC Announces Global Settlement with
U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.K. Serious Fraud Office, (Feb. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_1101517013.html.
4. Government Sting Snares 22 Individuals Employed by Military Equipment
Suppliers, FOLEY AND LARDNER LLP (Jan. 2010), http://www.foley.com/publications
/pub_detail.aspx?pubid=6752 [hereinafter Government Sting Snares]; Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military and Law
Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010).
5. Id.
6. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Resident Sentenced to 87 Months in
Prison for Bribing Foreign Gov’t Official, Office of Public Affairs (Apr. 19, 2010).
7. Samuel Rubenfeld, Conviction in Foreign Bribery Case is First in U.S. Trial,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2748703730804576315573205511018.html
8. Id.
9. George Terwilliger III et al., 2010: All Signs Point to a Record-Breaking Year
for FCPA Enforcement, WHITE & CASE LLP (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.whitecase
.com/alerts-03022010/.
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of executive certifications,” proactive law enforcement investigations,
and the global anti-fraud climate.10
U.S. firms competing for international business need to pay close
attention to several trends. First, the number of FCPA cases and the
severity of penalties will increase as the DOJ and SEC emphasize
enforcement. Second, FCPA compliance will become a top corporate
governance issue leading to more rigorous compliance. Third,
international harmonization of antifraud and anticorruption regulation
will lead to more parallel investigations and increased penalties. Fourth,
“FCPA investigations may trigger other actions such as shareholder
litigation, tax investigations, and money-laundering probes.”11 While
many corporate managers, financial officers, general counsels,
compliance officers, and internal and external auditors are aware of the
FCPA, “companies could benefit considerably from both increasing
their knowledge and awareness of the FCPA and improving their
capabilities to mitigate the risk of bribery and corruption.”12
This Article provides a close look at the requirements imposed on
U.S. and some foreign firms by the FCPA in the context of the emerging
trends noted above. The purposes of this article are to: (1) analyze and
describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions, payments (bribes),
and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and analyze the
important provisions of the FCPA; (3) analyze vicarious liability under
the FCPA; and (4) make recommendations to help firms improve their
compliance with the FCPA.
I. WHAT IS BRIBERY?
A bribe is an illegal and/or unethical business transaction that
involves “the offering, promising, or giving something in order to

10. Patrick Taylor, Strategic FCPA Compliance: The Role of Continuous
Monitoring as a Proactive Control, CORP. FIN. REV., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 20, 21.
11. Christopher Sulavik, Corruption Crackdown: How the FCPA is changing the
way the world does business, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 3 (July 2009), http://www.
pwc.com/us/en/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/publications/assets/pwc-corruption-crack
down-fcpa-2009.pdf.
12. Survey, Corruption or Compliance-Weighing the Costs-10th Global Fraud
Survey, ERNST & YOUNG, 2 (2008), http://www2.eycom.ch/publications/items/fraud
_report_10/ey_global_fraud_survey_10.pdf.
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influence a public official in the execution of his/her official duties.”13 A
key element that distinguishes unacceptable payments is the corruption
of a relationship of trust.14 In the public sector, “a bribe is an inducement
that influences a public official to perform his or her duties in a manner
contrary to the course that might otherwise be adopted.”15
One distinctive element of bribery is the quid pro quo—the sense
that office is abused in exchange for the benefit conferred.16 Two types
of benefits may be conferred upon bribe-givers: (1) “according-to-rule”
and (2) “against-the-rule” benefits.17 “According-to-rule benefits confer
something on the bribe-giver that the briber should have received under
the rules; the bribe-taker acts in a manner that he or she should have
done anyway.”18 According-to-rule benefits are “grease” or
“facilitation” payments. “These payments consist of small payments to a

13. International business firms engage in bribery for three reasons. First, in certain
countries, normal business transactions cannot be initiated or completed without paying
bribes. The firm may justify such conduct on the grounds of business necessity and that
it is merely doing what is the norm in the country. Second, although a firm may
recognize bribery as morally wrong, it may engage in it because other firms do it.
Third, firms in desperate need of business may resort to bribery to obtain it. See Rajib
Sanyal, Determinants of Bribery in International Business: The Cultural and Economic
Factors, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 139 (2005).
14. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
15. Wayne Hamra, Bribery in International Business Transactions and the OECD
Convention: Benefits and Limitations, 35(4) BUS. ECON. 34 (2000).
16. Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth
Century?: Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH.
J. INT’L. L. 451, 476 n.54 (1999). An example of the quid pro quo are the bribery
activities of Siemens A.G., a German engineering firm. In late 2008 and early 2009, the
firm settled bribery cases in the U.S. and Germany by paying penalties and fines of
more than $1.6 billion. Siemens managers and sales staff used a bribery slush fund to
gain favors from foreign officials on a global scale. Siemens paid $5 million in bribes to
the son of Bangladesh’s prime minister and other senior officials to win a mobile phone
contract. In Argentina, a Siemens’ subsidiary paid more than $40 million in bribes to
obtain a $1 billion agreement to produce national identity cards. In Venezuela, Siemens
paid $16 million to obtain urban rail lines. See Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At
Siemens, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1.
17. See Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third World Corruption: Implication of
an Indian Case, 39 WORLD POLITICS 508, 525 (1987); Nichols, supra note 16, at 460.
18. Carl Pacini et al., The Role of the OECD and EU Conventions in Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 386 (2002); see also
Nichols, supra note 16, at 460.
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person to obtain a favor such as expediting an administrative process;
obtaining a permit, license, or service; or avoiding an abuse of power.”19
An against-the-rule benefit is more egregious and “is exemplified
by the award of a contract to a party who should not have won the
contract. The abuse of office here-usually occurring in exchange for
large sums of money-involves the discretion of the public official.
Bribes paid to secure this type of benefit are referred to as ‘kickbacks’
or ‘grand corruption.’”20 Political or grand corruption involves relatively
large sums paid to alter policy formulation, legislation, and major
contract awards, which are tailored to favor narrowly defined private
interests. “When the payment involves relatively large sums of money
given with the aim of enticing the official to commit an illegal act to the
advantage of the person making the payment, ‘subornation’ occurs.”21
“Subornation is a request for officials to ‘look the other way,’ not to do
their jobs, to do the job more quickly, or even to knowingly break the
law.”22 “The degree of abuse tends to rise with the rank of the official
involved.”23
A second distinctive element of bribery involves the institutional
positions of bribe-payers and bribe recipients. Are they agents or
19.
Antonio Argandona, Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating
Payments, 60 J. BUS. ETHICS 251 (2005); Pacini et al., supra note 18. One school of
thought maintains that small-scale grease payments may perpetuate and nurture the
culture of bribery. Officials who expect to be—and are—paid relatively small bribes by
large companies will come to expect such payments from everyone merely to do their
official duties. See Alexander Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Repealing the Exemption for “Routine Government Action” Payments, 25 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 251 (2006). According to the “broken windows” hypothesis, low level
grease payments can spread to upper levels of government when corrupt officials are
promoted and higher-level officials are emboldened to ask for larger, more destructive
bribes. See Thomas Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the “Tipping Point”:
The Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 Nw.
J. INT’L L. BUS. 471, 477 (2001).
20. See Carl Pacini, Hudson Rogers & Judyth Swingen, The OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions:
A New Tool To Promote Transparency in Financial Reporting, 15 ADVANCES IN INT’L
ACCT. 121, 123 (2002); Nichols, supra note 16, 460-461
21. See Pacini, Rogers & Swingen, supra note 20.
22. P.R. CATEORA & J.L. GRAHAM, INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 137 (10th ed.
1999).
23. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 38 (K. Elliott ed., 1997); Pacini et al., supra
note 18, at 387.
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principals? Only payments made to agents can be classified as bribes.24
The possibility of bribery arises from the divergent interests of agents
and principals and from information asymmetry, which gives agents a
great deal of discretionary power. “Opportunities for corruption depend
on the size of rents in the control of public agents, the discretion they
have in allocating them, and their lack of a sense of accountability to
society.”25 Moreover, the trade of public goods illegally against payoffs
creates a market for corruption at the risk of having to pay a penalty.26
Bribery is a crime of calculation: public officials weigh the
expected benefits from corrupt behavior against the punishment imposed
by society if they get caught. The transaction costs of illegal exchanges
are important for maintaining secrecy. As bribery arrangements confer
no property rights, the bribe-giver may fail to provide the service as
agreed, may provide low quality goods and/or services, or may charge
inflated prices. Such contracts are risky because agents have no court of
law to which they can resort to in the event of a dispute.27 Bribery is
even more distortive than excessive taxes because bribery must be done
in secret.28
II. THE EXTENT OF BRIBERY
Precise quantitative estimates of the dollar amount of bribery are
impossible to obtain since neither bribe-givers nor bribe-takers disclose
the extent of their activities. The World Bank Institute has estimated that
the total amount of bribes paid per year may be $1 trillion.29 According
to Ernst & Young’s 10th Global Fraud Survey, about 23% of almost
1200 corporations across 33 nations admitted their organizations had
been approached to pay a bribe to retain or obtain business during the

24.

Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bribes, Patronage and Gift-Giving, in CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 93 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed.,
1999).
25. Jean Cartier-Bresson, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Economic
Analyses and Lessons Learnt, in NO LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL 11, 12 (2000).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L
BUS. STUDIES 807, 808 (2006); Cartier-Bresson, supra note 25.
28. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 600
(1993).
29. BBC News, One in 10 Families Pays Bribes, Dec. 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/4080995.stm.
AND
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prior two years.30 In the 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse, corruption schemes were found in one-third of fraud
situations and represented a median loss of $250,000.31
Another indication of the extent of the bribery problem is the
number of bribery scandals reported by the press. Huang Guangyu, a
Chinese business tycoon who founded Gome Electrical Appliances, was
formally charged with bribery, insider trading, and illegal business
dealings.32 Another Chinese investigation uncovered construction
project-related bribery activities that occurred over an 18-month period
from 2009 to 2011 involving around three billion Yuan in construction
contracts.33 Former Prince George’s County executive Jack B. Johnson
admitted in federal court that he accepted over $400,000 in bribes.34
According to a RCMP search warrant, Adriano Furgiuele, a former
“auditor at the Canada Revenue Agency received $150,000 from the
president of a company shortly after it got a favourable tax ruling.”35
Tay Ee Tiong, a seafood supplier in Singapore, pled guilty to twenty
counts of bribery for paying almost $1 million in kickbacks to nineteen
chefs at high-end Chinese restaurants.36

30. Sara Brandfon, Company Executives Risk Fines and Jail by Ignoring
AntiBribery Laws, BUSINESS WIRE (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.business
wire.com/news/home/20080515005983/en/Company-Executives-Risk-Fines-JailIgnoring-Anti-Bribery.
31. 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, ASS’N OF
CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, 4 (2010), available at http://www.acfe.com/uploaded
Files/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/rttn-2010.pdf.
32. Saibal Dasgupta, Charges Framed Against One-Time Richest Man in China,
TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/2010-02-16/china/28129165_1_charge-sheet-richest-man-huang-guangyu.
33. Toh Han Shih, Vice-Minister Unveils 156000 Corruption Cases With 5698
Offenders Punished, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 2011, at 6.
34. Ruben Castaneda & Miranda S. Spivack, Johnson, ex-county executive in
Prince George’s, pleads guilty to taking bribes, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/johnson-ex-county-executive-in-prince-geor
ges-pleads-guilty-to-taking-bribes/2011/05/17/AF0pP75G_story.html.
35. Daniel Leblanc, RCMP Alleges Ex-Auditor Received Payment, THE GLOBE
AND MAIL (Canada), May 17, 2011, at A8.
36. Elena Chong, Seafood Supplier Admits Bribing Chefs, THE STRAITS TIMES
(SING.), May 16, 2011, available at http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews
/Singapore/Story/STIStory_669245.html.
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III. ANALYSIS OF AND TRENDS IN FCPA CASES
Available data on FCPA cases filed by the SEC and the DOJ for the
years 2000-2009 was extracted and analyzed. The analysis considers the
number of cases filed by the SEC and the DOJ, cases disposed of and
pending, cases against corporations and individuals, and cases against
foreign corporations. This paper also assesses SEC and DOJ monetary
sanctions, total and mean value of business obtained, total and mean
amount of bribes (or payments), and ratio of bribes to value of business
obtained. In numerous instances, insufficient or no data was available.
The assessment of FCPA cases is outlined below and is based on the
data in Table 1.
One distinct trend is that SEC and DOJ enforcement efforts have
become more aggressive. Table 1 indicates that 232 FCPA cases were
initiated during the years 2000-2009. The number of FCPA cases filed
annually escalated considerably after 2004. Over 80% of case filings in
the decade ending in 2009 occurred during the years 2005-2009. In
2005, 14 cases were initiated compared to 67 in 2009. Approximately
64% of FCPA cases in the years 2000-2009 were initiated by the DOJ.
Specifically, the majority of the cases filed contributing to this rise have
involved DOJ criminal cases. In 2006, seven DOJ criminal cases were
filed. In 2009, that number rose to 52. Moreover, slightly more than
80% of FCPA cases have been resolved without going to trial. The SEC
and DOJ today have between 70 and 80 FCPA investigations underway
at any given time.37 The DOJ and SEC have shown an increased
willingness to bring enforcement actions against individuals. In fact,
Table 1 shows that, in sum, more cases have been brought against
individuals than corporations during the years 2000-2009. In 2007 and
2008, more FCPA cases were initiated against corporations than
individuals. In 2009, however, almost three times as many cases were
brought against individuals as compared to corporations (50 vs. 17). The
SEC and DOJ are sending a clear message that individuals will be held
liable for FCPA violations even when acting within the scope of their
employment.
A review of the enforcement of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (“OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention”) by Transparency International shows that the U.S. is the
37. 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3,
2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPA
Update.pdf.
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most aggressive country in prosecuting bribery. Although enforcement
by the other 37 member nations is improving, the U.S. accounted for
41% of criminal case sanctions (including deferred prosecution
agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs)) from
1999 to 2009 among all 38 parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention.38 From 1999 to 2009, twenty-three OECD countries
imposed no criminal sanctions on individuals or legal persons for
foreign bribery.39 Despite increased FCPA enforcement, U.S.
corporations continue to pay bribes out of business necessity because of
the leniency of other countries.40
Table 1 demonstrates a pattern of increasing monetary sanctions in
both SEC and DOJ cases during the last decade. Both total and mean
monetary sanctions have increased considerably. In 2004, total SEC
monetary sanctions were $16.4 million. In 2007, SEC monetary
sanctions exceeded $86 million. Total SEC monetary sanctions were
over $200 million in 2008 and 2009. For 2008, the mean sanction was
over $33 million. Moreover, total DOJ monetary sanctions climbed
significantly throughout the last decade. In 2004, total DOJ monetary
sanctions were just over $6 million. In 2008 and 2009, such sanctions
exceeded $400 million. Mean monetary sanctions escalated from $3
million in 2004 to over $30 million in 2008 and 2009. Total monetary
sanctions have increased for two reasons. First, the rise in the number of
FCPA cases has increased the total monetary sanctions collected by the
government. Second, the size or amount of the fines levied has also
escalated.
Table 1 presents a summary of data on total and mean values of
business obtained by bribers, the amount of bribes or payments, and the
mean ratio of payments to business obtained in SEC cases. A lack of
available data makes it virtually impossible to draw any conclusions
about the value of business obtained for the years 2000-2004. However,
in the second half of the last decade, a steady increase occurred in the
total value and mean value of business obtained, except from 2008 to
2009. This decline may be attributable to the severe global recession.

38. Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery
Convention, OECD (2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/45450341.pdf.
39. Id.
40. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 307, 313
(2008).
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Table 1 highlights an increase in the mean amount of bribes paid to
foreign public officials since 2005. One cannot conclude, however, that
more money is being spent on bribes to obtain or retain a dollar’s worth
of business. One must consider the mean ratio of bribes paid to business
obtained. Since 2005, this ratio has varied from 1.3% to over 27%. From
2005 to 2009, the weighted average ratio of bribes paid to business
obtained was about .1533. This means that, on average, bribe-givers
spend just over $0.15 in bribes for each $1 in business obtained or
retained in SEC cases.
Table 1 also summarizes the total and mean values of business
obtained by bribe-givers, the amount of bribes or payments, and the
mean ratio of payments to business obtained in DOJ cases. Since 2005,
the total value of business obtained rose from about $751 million to $6.5
billion in 2009. A decrease occurred from $9.5 billion in 2008 to $6.5
billion in 2009. This reflects a similar decline in the total value of
business obtained in SEC cases. The mean value of business obtained
increased from $37.3 million per case in 2005 to $225 million per case
in 2009. The mean value of business obtained per case was lower in
2009 than it was in 2007 and 2008, but still significantly higher than in
2005.
In 2005, the total amount of bribes paid increased exponentially
compared to the early 2000s (except 2004). Total bribery payments then
tailed off significantly in 2006 for DOJ cases. A look at total bribery
payments for the years 2006-2009 shows both a substantial increase and
great volatility. The same pattern exists for the mean amount of bribery
payments in DOJ cases.
An interesting statistic is the mean ratio of bribery payments to
business obtained for DOJ cases. This ratio shows a relatively steady
increase for the years 2004-2009. The weighted average ratio of bribes
to the value of business obtained for 2000 to 2009 (excluding 2000 and
2003 for lack of data) is .1390 for DOJ cases. This is slightly lower than
the weighted average of .1533 for SEC cases. This means that bribe
payers spend about $0.14 for each $1 in business obtained or retained in
DOJ cases.
Another clear trend in FCPA enforcement is increased cooperation
between U.S. and foreign law enforcement authorities.41 The DOJ is
working closely with its sister agencies, especially in Western Europe,
41. Taylor, supra note 10, at 20-25; Jeff Everett, D. Neu, & A. S. Rahman,
Accounting and the Global Fight Against Corruption, 32 ACCT., ORGS., & SOC’Y. 513,
526 (2007); Government Sting Snares, supra note 4.
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“to share evidence and theories and obtain access to witnesses.”42 “The
Norwegian energy company Statoil ASA became the subject of the first
criminal FCPA enforcement action against a non-U.S. company over a
plan to bribe an Iranian government official in exchange for oil and gas
development contracts.”43 There have been other cases involving FCPA
prosecution of foreign firms since Statoil ASA. Other cases include
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc.,44 United States v. Technip
S.A.,45 and United States v. Naaman.46 The trend towards increased
global FCPA enforcement continues unabated with numerous actions
against foreign companies, sending the message that businesses must
stop engaging in bribery to obtain or retain business. “Among the
developments that are anticipated are widespread multi-jurisdictional
anti-bribery efforts with facilitated cross-border evidence gathering,
asset seizures, speedy extradition, and increased scrutiny of American
firms abroad, often without constitutional safeguards.”47

42.

Mark Miller, Corruption Cases Go International, NAT’L. L. J., Mar. 26, 2007,

at 1.
43. Michael Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-1977 to
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 113 (2010).
44. United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004-001-003 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 17, 2007).
45. United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-CR-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010).
Jean Fourcand, President, Fourcand Enterprises, Inc., pleaded guilty on Feb. 19, 2010 to
engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from a scheme to bribe
former Haitian government officials to gain telecommunication contracts. The Haitian
government provided substantial assistance in gathering evidence during the
investigation. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Florida Businessman Pleads Guilty to
Money Laundering in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Feb. 19, 2010).
46. United States v. Naaman, No. 08-246-(ESH) (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2008). A
Canadian /Lebanese citizen named Ousama M. Naaman pleaded guilty to participating
in an eight-year conspiracy to defraud the U.N. Oil for Food Program and bribe Iraqi
officials in connection with the sale of a chemical additive used in the refining of leaded
fuel. He was arrested in Germany and extradited to the U.S. Investigative assistance
was provided by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice,
Innospec Agent Pleads Guilty to Bribing Iraqi Officials and Paying Kickbacks Under
the Oil for Food Program (June 25, 2010).
47. Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647,
678 (Spring 2010).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Two central themes are captured by the FCPA. The first is that no
entity or person may offer or pay anything of value to the official of a
foreign government or certain international organizations that would
cause the official to misuse power or influence to benefit a business
interest of any entity or person.48 The second is that if any payment is
made to an official, whether the purpose is proper or corrupt, the
payment must be reported in the payer’s financial statements according
to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).49
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA anti-bribery provisions,
implementing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions.50 The
amendments extended the jurisdictional reach of the anti-bribery
provisions to U.S. persons or entities acting outside the U.S. and nonU.S. persons acting within U.S. territory.51 The amendments also added
the words “securing any improper advantage” as a prohibited purpose to
the FCPA’s existing list, defined “foreign official” to include officials of
public international organizations (e.g., the World Bank), and extended
criminal penalties of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions to foreign
employees and agents of U.S. entities.52

48. William Athanas, When Doing Business Internationally Becomes a Crime:
Assisting Clients in Understanding and Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 71 ALA. LAW. 382, 383-384 (2010); Stuart Deming, The Potent and BroadRanging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 467 (2006).
49. Id.
50. In November 1997, 34 nations signed the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Signatory
nations “have bound themselves to prevent bribery by multinational firms by
criminalizing ‘active’ bribery of other nations’ officials, whether or not those countries
are signatories to the OECD Convention. The 1997 convention distances itself from the
traditional model of penal law conventions in that its norms are self-executing . . . .
Some nations have enacted legislation with more lenient standards than others thereby
putting the nations with stricter standards at a competitive disadvantage.” Pacini et al.,
supra note 18, at 390, 397.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i), 78ff(c) (2006); Amy Dean Westbrook,
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 502 (2011); Baker, supra note 47, at 65758.
52. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105366, 112 Stat. 3302, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
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In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.53 Section 922 grants
significant protections and rewards to individuals who voluntarily
provide the SEC with original information relating to the violation of the
FCPA (and other securities laws). Individuals (apart from certain
ineligible persons such as law enforcement officers) who provide
original information that leads to the assessment of monetary sanctions
in excess of $1 million are entitled to receive between 10% and 30% of
the sanction amount as a reward.54 No award will be made, however, to
any whistleblower who gains the information through an audit of
financial statements of a publicly traded firm.55 The law provides a
private right of action in federal court for whistleblowers regardless of
administrative delay.56 Dodd-Frank also increases the statute of
limitations for whistleblower protection actions to six years following
the alleged violation.57
It is not yet certain that the new whistleblower provisions will
increase the quality of reporting and improve fraud detection.58 In
addition, the 10% floor on rewards might not be cost effective. “There is
little evidence in the legislative history of Dodd-Frank that Congress
contemplated whether the law’s costs might exceed the residual amount
of fraud enforcement proceeds in the Investor Protection Fund once
bounties are paid from the Fund.”59 Also, the reward or bounty program
may lead to unnecessary litigation as the law entitles whistleblowers to
appeal the amount of any award granted by the SEC.60
A. ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS
The basic elements of any FCPA bribery violation are: (1) a private
or publicly traded firm or any foreign person in the U.S.; (2) who
53. Mara V.J. Senn & Rachel L. Frankel, Wall Street Reform Law Creates
Foreign-Payment Legal Hazards, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 6, 2010, at 24.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 922(a), 21F(b)(1) (2006).
55. Id. §§ 922(a), 21F(c)(2)(a).
56. Id §§ 922(a), 21F(h)(1)(B)(i).
57. Id. §§ 922(a), 21F(h)(1)(B)(iii)(aa).
58. Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 127 (2011).
59. Id. at 142.
60. Id. at 143; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§
922(a), 21F(f).
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corruptly; (3) pays or offers to pay money or anything of value; (4) to a
foreign official or a foreign political party or to any person while
knowing that all or part of the payment will be offered or paid to a
foreign official; (5) for the purpose of influencing the official to obtain,
retain, or direct business to any person or to secure an improper
advantage.61 All elements must be proven by credible evidence for the
SEC and/or DOJ to prevail in a case.
V. WHO IS COVERED BY THE ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS?
The anti-bribery provisions are broader than the accounting/internal
control provisions of the FCPA. The former apply to “issuers,”
“domestic concerns” and “foreign persons” acting within the U.S.62 An
“issuer” is a public company subject to the registration or reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which includes
firms using American Depositary Receipts (that are listed on an
American exchange).63 A “domestic concern” is any business (including
those privately or family owned) that has its principal place of business
in the U.S. or is organized under the laws of the U.S., its states,
territories or possessions.64 In addition, citizens, nationals, or residents
of the U.S. are “domestic concerns.”65 Officers, directors, employees,
agents and stockholders of foreign persons are also subject to the FCPA
if they commit a violation while in the U.S. The FCPA provides that a
foreign citizen, who is an agent of a domestic concern, is subject to the
anti-bribery provisions even for acts committed outside the U.S.66 A
recent FCPA enforcement action demonstrated the government’s
willingness to prosecute U.S. companies and executives for business

61.
62.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
The FCPA is intended to cover all foreign persons who commit any act in
furtherance of a bribe while in the U.S. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
64. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).
65. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A). Instances of an individual indicted as a “domestic
concern” occurred in United States v. Ott, Crim. No. CR 07-608 (D.N.J. Jul. 25, 2007)
and United States v. Steph, Crim. No. CR H07-307 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 19, 2007).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. In United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 176,
181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the district court dismissed an indictment against a Swiss
citizen based on the wording of the FCPA before some 1998 amendments. The district
court decision makes clear that the FCPA, as amended, applies to such individuals. See
also United States v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd., No. 05-CR-282 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005).
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activity occurring entirely abroad, despite domestic-based personnel’s
lack of direct knowledge and participation.67
Generally, the activities of a foreign subsidiary or joint venture of a
U.S. corporation are not subject to the FCPA.68 The U.S. government
“could have jurisdiction over acts (and those who authorize such acts)
that occur outside the U.S. if such acts trigger or cause further acts to
occur within the territory of the United States.”69 Moreover, a U.S.
parent may be held liable for the foreign subsidiary’s acts if the
relationship between the parent and affiliate is legally close.70
Monitoring of all international business activity is vital to U.S.-based
international business.
Two possible means exist to reach foreign affiliates under the
FCPA: (1) through the direct liability of either the affiliate or its officials
or both; (2) holding either the parent, its officials or both, liable for the
actions of the affiliate. As to the first means, the FCPA provides for
direct liability of the foreign affiliate of a U.S. firm (or any officer,
director, employee, agent or stockholder acting on the affiliate’s behalf)
if the affiliate is publicly traded or causes an act in furtherance of the
bribe to occur in a U.S. territory.71 In U.S. v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd.,72 for
example, the DOJ treated a Chinese subsidiary as an agent of the U.S.
parent for purposes of anti-bribery violations. DPC Tianjin paid about
$1.6 million in “improper commissions,” over an 11-year period, to
doctors and laboratory personnel of state-owned hospitals.73 The
67. Litigation Release, Exchange Act No. 21162 ¶¶ 66-69 (July 31, 2009)
(announcing settlement against two executives for liability as “control persons” who
failed to supervise employees who made illegal bribes to Brazilian customs officials
and falsified accounts to conceal the bribes), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation
/complaints/2009/comp21162.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C.
1992).
69. Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 959, 962 (2009); DON
ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4-29 (1st ed.
1995).
70. See In re Schnitzer Industries, Inc., AAER No. 2493 (Oct. 16, 2006), available
at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/91b/91bf8f0a302071c4b846d8b92bd9c8a9.pdf?i=45
26294.
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 3(a) (2006).
72. United States v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd., No. CR 05-482, at 1 (C.D. Cal. May 20,
2005).
73. Id. at 2-5.
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commissions were approved by the general manager of DPC Tianjin and
booked in that firm’s financial statements as “selling expenses.”74 DPC
Tianjin routinely sent these financial statements to its parent’s
headquarters in Los Angeles where they were included in consolidated
financial statements. Acts that occurred in U.S. territory in furtherance
of bribes included faxes, telephone calls and emails with the U.S. parent.
The FCPA’s reach over agents of issuers requires merely the use of
interstate commerce related to some act in furtherance of an improper
payment. This is one of a few cases that demonstrates the ability of
enforcement agencies to reach the activities of foreign affiliates despite
their technical exclusion from the statute’s coverage.
It is more common for a U.S. parent, venture, or personnel to be
liable for the corrupt practices of foreign affiliates. One basis for parent
company liability turns on whether or not the parent participated in the
improper conduct. The FCPA itself provides for direct parent liability
under these conditions or scenarios: (1) the commission of an act in
furtherance of an improper payment by the parent; (2) the
“authorization” by the parent of the affiliate’s action; or (3) a direct
offer, promise or transfer of value by the parent.75 The parent is not
liable absent knowledge of the corrupt purpose of the payment.76
Given the broad definition of “knowledge” accepted by the courts,
criminal liability may be based on parent acquiescence (which is less
than direct knowledge) in an affiliate’s corrupt payments. “A critical
issue for parent companies facing FCPA liability will be the extent to
which suspicious payments made by a subsidiary were documented and
discussed with the parent.”77 If the books and records of the affiliate
accurately reflect the use of assets to make bribery payments to foreign
officials, then the parent has notice of corrupt behavior.78 If the parent
takes no action then it may be deemed to have constructive knowledge
of the payments.79

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 5.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a) (2006).
Id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(A).
See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action:
Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 298
(2007).
78. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 28 (1998).
79. Id.
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VI. WHEN IS A PAYMENT MADE “CORRUPTLY?”
The FCPA renders it illegal to make a payment “corruptly” to a
foreign official or to “corruptly” commit any act within the U.S. in
pursuit of prohibited conduct. The statute itself does not define the term
“corruptly.” The lack of a statutory definition presents problems for
corporate counsel, corporate executives, board members, and regulators.
The legislative history of the FCPA provides some guidance.
The statute’s legislative history indicates Congress’ intent:
[T]he word ‘corruptly’ is used in order to make clear that the offer,
payment, promise or gift must be intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to
the payer . . . or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable
regulation. The word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose,
80
an intent to wrongfully influence the recipients.

Case law also yields insight into the meaning of “corruptly.” One
leading case that analyzes the meaning of “corruptly” under the FCPA is
United States v. Liebo.81 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court’s jury instruction regarding the meaning of “corruptly”:
[T]he offer, promise to pay, payment, or authorization of payment,
must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official
position or to influence someone to do so and that an act is
“corruptly” done if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a
bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or
82
lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.

A defendant need not be aware of the actual statutory provision nor
know of the FCPA’s existence to be found guilty of an anti-bribery
violation.83 The statute does require either the intent to influence an
80.
81.

H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991). The federal appellate court found that a
jury could infer corrupt intent where the evidence showed: (i) a close temporal link
between the gift of airline tickets and the approval of a contract; (ii) a close relationship
between the recipient of the gift and influential government officials; and (iii) a
classification of the gift by the giver as a commission in company records. Id.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). In this case, the
federal government charged two executives of a Texas rice exporter with bribing
Haitian customs officials to reduce customs duties. The defendants argued that bribes
paid for tax avoidance fell outside the ambit of the FCPA because the customs officers
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official act or a quid pro quo element.84 The bribe or illegal gratuity
must be linked to a specific government action or meet the requirement
that some particular official act be identified and proved.85
VII.

ANYTHING OF VALUE

Although the FCPA does not define the term “anything of value,”
the law prohibits not only consummated bribes but also unaccepted
offers of bribes. Recent enforcement actions indicate that there are
virtually no limitations on what can be considered “anything of value.”
In the enforcement action against Kellogg, Brown and Root LLC and
various other Halliburton Company affiliates, “things of value” provided
to Nigerian officials included cash-stuffed briefcases and/or cash-loaded
vehicles left in hotel parking lots.86 In contrast to this case, a FCPA
action against UTStarcom, Inc. involved providing executive training
programs at U.S. universities to Chinese officials even though the
programs “were not specifically related to [the company’s] products or
business.”87 The payment or offer of payment of “anything of value”
includes employment of officials as consultants, expense paid travel,
loans with favorable interest rates and repayment terms, golf outings,
sports equipment, transportation of household goods, discounts and
college scholarships.88 Courts often consider whether the defendant
subjectively attached value to the item in question.89

were not involved in facilitating the defendants’ business contracts. Although this
argument prevailed at the district court level, the Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal
holding that the statute’s legislative history indicates Congress intended to find a
violation when a bribe improved business opportunities. Id. at 749-50. The Kay
decision, however, does not address payments made in connection with an expectation
of business. Furthermore, the Court’s opinion does not address instances where there is
a substantial temporal gap between the payment and the foreign official’s act; see also
Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y. 137, 146 (2010).
84. See United States v. Quinn, 359 F. 3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2004).
85. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 406
(1999).
86. United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6,
2009).
87. SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. CV 09-6094, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009).
88. United States. v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 721 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 486 (2nd Cir. 1996); United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 130910 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hare, 618 F.2d 1085, 1086 (4th Cir. 1980); United
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VIII. WHO IS A “FOREIGN OFFICIAL?”
The FCPA broadly defines a “foreign official” as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or
90
instrumentality.

The OECD Convention defines a “foreign public official” as any
person in a foreign country who holds a legislative, administrative, or
judicial office, or who exercises a public function, including a public
agency or enterprise. The term also covers officials of public
international organizations.91
Under the FCPA, “a foreign official is anyone who acts in an
official capacity for a foreign government and who exercises some
discretionary authority,” which includes “an officer of a foreign
government” and even “an officer in its armed forces.”92 The term also
covers any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of a
state-owned enterprise or business.93
The FCPA does not provide guidance concerning what types of
entities are “instrumentalities” of a foreign government such that their
employees are “foreign officials.”94 It remains unclear what level of
government ownership or control will make a business an “agency or
instrumentality” of the state. Despite the lack of guidance, the DOJ and

States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d in part, 28 F.3d 283
(3rd Cir. 1994).
89. See Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647,
658-59 (2010).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006).
91. See supra text accompanying note 50.
92. Robert A. Youngberg, A Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 UTAH
B.J. 22, 23 (2005).
93. See Roger M. Witten et al., Prescription for Compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery
Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 697
(2009).
94. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway? 63
BUS. LAW. 1243 (2008).
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SEC broadly interpret the definition of “foreign official” in application
to state-owned enterprises.95
One of the most aggressive agency interpretations of “foreign
official” in the context of a state-owned enterprise occurred in the
KBR/Halliburton case.96 The SEC and DOJ claimed that officers and
employees of Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) were “foreign officials”
even though NLNG was 51% owned by multinational oil companies and
49% owned by Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).97 The
enforcement agencies claimed that effective control of NLNG belonged
to NNPC.98 The DOJ has indicated that the totality of the circumstances
must be analyzed, including “the precise percentage of government
ownership, whether the government has veto power of shareholder
decisions, and the extent to which the government participates in day-today administration of the entity.”99
The DOJ and SEC interpretation(s) of “foreign official” have yet to
be tested in a federal appellate court. The significance of such a test is
growing since the agency interpretation has become central to many
enforcement actions in recent years.100 Indeed, a clear federal appellate
court interpretation would reduce uncertainty for business, although the
high settlement rate for FCPA cases nevertheless evidences a reluctance
on the part of U.S. businesses to litigate such difficult issues.
The need for a clear court interpretation increases as business
ownership arrangements evolve on a global scale. For example,
government efforts around the globe to stimulate economies may have
created a new type of foreign official. Government ownership has
95. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010).
96. Bass, Berry & Sims LLP, Halliburton and KBR Bring FCPA Settlement Total
to Over $1.3 Billion in the Last 60 Days Alone, ANTITRUST & TRADE PRACTICES ALERT,
Feb. 12, 2009. In February 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a former subsidiary of
Halliburton, agreed to pay the DOJ “a fine of $402 million to settle FCPA charges
related to the payment of about $180 million to foreign officials in Nigeria from 1994 to
2004.” Nigerian officials awarded KBR four contracts worth $6 billion to build natural
gas facilities. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads
Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb.
12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/2009/02/02-1109Kellogg-guilty.pdf.
97. Id.; United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 6, 2009).
98. Bass, Berry & Sims LLP, supra note 96.
99. Witten et al., supra note 93, at 697.
100. Koehler, supra note 95, at 410-12.
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increased substantially in many economies. Financial institutions,
sovereign wealth funds and other organizations involve heavy
government ownership positions.101 Are employees of these firms
“foreign officials” under the FCPA?
IX. THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
The FCPA criminalizes both direct bribes and payments to
intermediaries for the purpose of bribing foreign officials. While
proving that a FCPA defendant knew or had knowledge that a payment
to a foreign official was unlawful is often not an issue in direct bribery
cases, it often becomes a contentious point in cases involving third party
agents. In such cases, the FCPA outlaws payments to any person “while
‘knowing’ that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given, or promised, to any foreign official for a purpose
prohibited by the FCPA.”102
The FCPA itself provides that a person has knowledge or is
“knowing” when (1) “such person is aware that such person is engaging
in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur,” or (2) “such person has a firm belief that
such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to
occur.”103 The statute defines conscious avoidance as “knowledge of the
existence of a particular circumstance,” established by being “aware of a
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person
actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.”104
Clearly, the statutory definition of “knowing” is much broader than
just actual knowledge. Until recently, the SEC and DOJ believed that
the knowledge requirement could be met by a showing that a FCPA
101. Id. at 414. Westbrook, supra note 51, at 535-536. For example, the Royal Bank
of Scotland is 68.4% owned by the U.K. government. BNP Paribas is partially owned
by the government of France. Sovereign wealth funds make large cross-border
investments in various firms and are sometimes directly owned by their home country
governments (e.g., The China Investment Corporation).
102.
Kenneth Winer & Gregory Husisian, Recent Opinion Sheds Light on the
Relevance of Due Diligence to the FCPA’s Knowledge Requirement, 4 CORP.
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2, Nov. 13, 2009 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/c03363c0-d03a-46e7-9015-c857d46e82fa
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/64e3d2de-9003-4ab0-b224-c8b5bfad536b
/CorporateAccount2009.pdf.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2006).
104. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
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defendant had failed to perform adequate due diligence (with regard to
red flags that a third party could possibly make improper payments).
Such a “knowing” standard is intended to capture business managers or
owners who fail to take action when red flags of a FCPA violation arise.
In United States v. Kozeny,105 a federal district court ruled that this
was an incorrect interpretation of the “knowledge” requirement. Bourke,
a designer of handbags, had invested $8 million in a business venture
(formed by Czech expatriate Victor Kozeny) that contemplated
purchasing an Azerbaijani oil company.106 Kozeny purportedly paid
bribes to Azerbaijani government officials in a failed effort to buy the
state-owned oil company.107 A jury convicted Bourke of conspiring to
violate the anti-bribery provisions.108 In a court brief, the government
argued that Bourke’s failure to conduct adequate due diligence, plus
awareness of a high probability that there were bribes, satisfied the
knowledge requirement.109 Nevertheless, the district court found that the
knowledge requirement cannot be met merely by a failure to perform
adequate due diligence.110 Bourke could be found to have knowledge
only because he took affirmative steps to avoid knowledge, and he
possessed awareness of a high probability that there were bribes.111
The Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Jacobs112 and the
legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA113 support the
Kozeny court’s analysis of the knowledge requirement. The Kozeny
decision rejected the efforts of the DOJ and SEC to return the FCPA to
the more lax standard of “reason to know” that prevailed before the
1988 amendments to the FCPA.114 Mere negligence in not performing
due diligence does not satisfy the FCPA knowledge requirement.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 2.
Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 374-77.
Id. at 371.
Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 2.
See Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 385-88.
Id. at 374, 385-89.
United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub.
nom., Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). In Jacobs, the government alleged
that the defendants had knowingly dealt in stolen securities. 475 F.2d at 273-74. The
court noted the important distinction between recklessness and willful blindness. Id. at
287. Reckless disregard by itself is not enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement.
Id.
113. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 919-20 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1952.
114. Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 4, 5, 7.
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X. INFLUENCING AN OFFICIAL TO OBTAIN OR RETAIN BUSINESS
OR SECURE AN IMPROPER ADVANTAGE
The fifth element of the anti-bribery provision—also called the
business nexus requirement—requires that a FCPA violator must take
some action to influence a foreign official to “obtain or retain . . . , to
direct business to any person, or to obtain an improper advantage.”115
Congress did not define these terms, but limited judicial guidance
supports a broad interpretation. “Business” is not limited to foreign
government contracts but includes any commercial activity.116 In U.S. v.
Kay,117 the issue before the court concerned whether payments to
Haitian officials for lowering customs duties and sales taxes satisfied the
business nexus requirement. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the FCPA’s legislative history, deeming the words
“obtain or retain business” to be ambiguous.118 Although the court held
that making payments to foreign officials to lower customs duties and
taxes could provide an unfair advantage and assist the payer in obtaining
or retaining business,119 such payments do not automatically satisfy the
business nexus element of the FCPA.120 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
FCPA’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to extend
liability to situations where bribes improved business opportunities (in
addition to allowing an entity to obtain or retain business).121 The Kay
decision broadened the scope of the business nexus element to cover
payments made to gain a comparative advantage or improve business
opportunity (or obtain an improper advantage).122
Indeed, the SEC and DOJ continue to interpret the fifth element
broadly to include payments intended to influence governmental
decisions having a positive impact on a defendant’s business. For
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006).
Youngberg, supra note 92, at 24.
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 749-50.
See Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law
Against Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International
Lawyer, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2006).
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example, in U.S. v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc.,123 various subsidiaries of
Vetco Gray paid a $26 million fine for paying bribes to customs officials
in Nigeria to obtain preferential treatment in the customs clearance
process and in the importation of equipment. The charges did not
specifically allege that the payments were made to “obtain or retain
business.”124 Nevertheless, Vetco Gray did not contest the government’s
interpretation of the phrase.125
A. EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
1. Facilitating or Expediting Payments
Congress created a “facilitating payments” exception to the FCPA
in recognition of the fact that small “grease” payments are “a cost of
doing business” in many countries.126 The exception was created in 1988
when corporations complained that international business with the
United States would suffer substantially without these payments.127 The
FCPA’s legislative history includes a four-factor test to help distinguish
between facilitating payments and illegal payments for “obtaining or
retaining business.”128 With regard to payment purpose, Congress sought
to criminalize: (1) payments intended to alter discretionary decisionmaking so as to increase the payer’s business; (2) payments that are
unusually large in relation to the government action done; (3) payments
that directly affect competition in contracts; and (4) payments in
exchange for services to which the bribe-giver is not entitled.129 Various
courts that have considered the “facilitating payments” exception have

123. Plea Agreement at 16, United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 07-CR0004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud
/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls.html.
124. Id. at 36.
125. See Plea Agreement, supra note 123, at 33-55.
126. Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back
the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 379, 383-85
(2005); Bixby, supra note 43, at 110-11.
127. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916 (1988).
128. Id. at 921, 1547, 1954.
129. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, at 77 (1987); Charles B. Weinograd, Clarifying Grease:
Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine
Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 509, 518-519 (2010).
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noted the importance of these four factors; and the test was actually
adopted in U.S. v. Kay.130
Moreover, SEC administrative proceedings provide some insight
into how that agency evaluates this exception. The SEC’s treatment of
the “facilitating payments” exception provides guidance for
understanding its application within organizations covered by the
antibribery provisions. SEC publications emphasize the significance of
two factors: “the discrectionary nature of the acts performed and the
degree to which the payor was entitled to the benefits of the payee’s
performance.”131 In 2004, for example, BJ Services Company entered
into a settlement agreement with the SEC concerning several alleged
bribes, including a $10,000 payment to a representative of Argentina’s
Secretary of Industry and Commerce.132 BJ Services paid the official to
hasten the importation of business equipment held up for delivery.133 A
payment made to expedite the customs process is an example of a
facilitating payment and is permissible under the FCPA.134 Although the
SEC did not expressly state that the payment fell within the FCPA
exception, the SEC’s separate treatment of the payment shows the
agency considered it distinguishable.135
The FCPA indicates that payments to expedite the following
routine governmental actions are deemed “facilitating payments”:
(i)

obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to
qualify a person to do business in a foreign country;

(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work
orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, or
scheduling
inspections
associated
with
contract
performance or inspections related to transit of goods
across country;

130. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004); Weinograd, supra note
129, at 525.
131. Weinograd, supra note 129, at 521.
132. In re BJ Servs. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49-390 (Mar. 10,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49390.htm.
133. Id.
134. Weinograd, supra note 129, at 522-23.
135. Id.
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(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading
and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or
136
commodities from deterioration . . . .

The FCPA contains no cap on the amount of a “facilitating
payment,” but in practice those permitted have been under U.S.
$1000.137 Moreover, it is imperative that any “facilitating payment” be
accurately recorded on the payer’s books.138 Great care must be
exercised in making “facilitating payments” given the amorphous nature
of the exception.139
XI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
One affirmative defense is if a payment is “lawful under the written
laws and regulations” of the foreign official’s country.140 Notably,
“lawful under written law” is different from being consistent with local
custom and practice.141 Likewise, the defense is also not activated by the
lack of or non-existence of written laws in the foreign official’s
country.142 In United States v. Kozeny, Frederic Bourke attempted to
invoke this defense by contending that payments made to Azeri officials
were lawful under the laws of Azerbaijan because they were selfreported and no Azeri prosecution would ensue.143 The claim that failure
to prosecute bribery is tacit approval of such activity was dismissed by
the trial court.144 No country in the world—even those with the most
pervasive cultures of corruption—authorizes bribes under its written
laws.145

136.
137.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A) (2006).
Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 575, 587 (2006).
138. Youngberg, supra note 92, at 25.
139. One source of trouble for businesses is the meaning of the word “routine.” A
U.S. business can interpret the word to mean “frequently,” or “ordinary” or
“commonplace.” Although the FCPA sets forth examples of “routine” governmental
actions, the statute provides sparse guidance when questionable situations arise that are
not listed in the law. Koch, supra note 126, at 389-90.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1).
141. Athanas, supra note 48, at 385.
142. Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in
Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 347, 357 (2011).
143. United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
144. Id. at 539.
145. Athanas, supra note 48, at 385.
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A second affirmative defense is available for “reasonable and bona
fide expenditures, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on
behalf of a foreign official” that are directly related to “(A) the
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B)
the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign
government.”146 The government strictly construes this defense,
knowing that firms will use it as a means of hiding excessive payments
under the guise of reasonable promotional expenses.147 In U.S. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,148 the DOJ found that expenses were excessive.
An engineering firm submitted a bid for work on an Egyptian
infrastructure project. On two occasions, the engineering firm paid for
first-class airfare from Egypt and luxury hotel accommodations for an
Egyptian official, his wife and children.
Affirmative defenses are just that; they are not exceptions. A party
charged with a FCPA violation must prove that the payments satisfy the
affirmative defense.
A. LACK OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The FCPA itself has no private right of action. Further, case law
has held that no private right of action is implied by the FCPA statute.149
FCPA enforcement actions, however, have given rise to FCPA-derived
lawsuits by plaintiffs, including shareholders, other governments and
business partners. In In re Immucor Inc. Securities Litigation,150
shareholder-plaintiffs brought a §10(b) lawsuit after Immucor’s stock
price fell upon the initiation of a FCPA investigation by the SEC.

146.
147.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (2006).
Brooks, supra note 83, at 146-47; Baker, supra note 47, at 663-64; Maris &
Singer, supra note 137, at 588-89; Arthur Aronoff, Foreign Corrupt Practice Act AntiBribery Provisions, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 503, 509, 512-13 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 943, 1997).
148. United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 1: 99CV12566 (D. Mass. Dec. 14,
1999); Jones Day, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Walking the Fine Line of
Compliance in China, 5 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.jonesday.com/theforeign-corrupt-practices-act-walking-the-fine-line-of-compliance-in-china-09-262008/.
149. Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1086 (1991).
150. In re Immucor Inc. Secs Litigation, No. 1:05-CV-2276-(WSD), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72335 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2006).
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Immucor agreed to settle the suit for $2.5 million.151 In February 2008,
technology firm FARO settled a class-action securities fraud lawsuit
brought by shareholders for $6.9 million in connection with payments
made by the company in its Chinese operations.152 In another case, Las
Vegas Sands shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit against various
company officers in federal court alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
abuse of control, waste of corporate assets, and conspiracy involving
alleged improper bribes in violation of the FCPA.153 Conduct that
violates the anti-bribery provisions may also give rise to a private cause
of action for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO),154 or to actions under other federal or state
laws.
B. USE OF RELATED STATUTES
The BAE Systems case (in which the company plead guilty to
conspiracy and violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the
FCPA) demonstrates that federal enforcement agencies sometimes rely
on other statutes that are complementary to the FCPA.155
Complementary statutes such as export control laws,156 false statement
statutes,157 mail and wire fraud158 and money laundering laws159 may be
employed in bringing bribery-related charges. In essence, the FCPA is
not the only anti-corruption statute on which U.S. businesses should be
focused. Indeed, complementary statutes also permit regulatory
authorities to seek harsher penalties.

151.
152.
153.

Sulavik, supra note 11, at 16.
Id. at 16.
Steve Green, Shareholders Sue Over Probes Facing Las Vegas Sands, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/apr/01
/shareholders-sue-over-probes-facing-las-vegas-sand/.
154. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 589; Sulavik, supra note 11, at 16. The text
of RICO can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
156. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2009); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2009).
157. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 287, 1621, 1623.
158. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
159. Id. §§ 1956, 1957.
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C. ACCOUNTING AND INTERNAL CONTROL PROVISIONS
1. Keep Accurate and Complete Books and Records
Publicly traded firms are required to “make and keep books,
records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company.”160
The recordkeeping provisions are intended to prevent three types of
improprieties: (1) the failure to record illegal transactions; (2) the
falsification of records to conceal illegal transactions; and (3) the
creation of records that are quantitatively accurate but fail to specify
qualitative aspects of the transaction.161 No materiality requirement
applies with regard to making and keeping accurate financial records.
Although the FCPA does not define “books, records, and
accounts,” the statute applies to a wide variety of corporate records. For
FCPA purposes, records include “accounts, correspondence,
memorandums, tapes, disks, papers, books, and other documents or
transcribed information of any type whether expressed in ordinary or
machine language.”162 One federal court has observed that “virtually any
tangible embodiment of information made or kept by an issuer is within
the scope of [the accounting provisions].”163 Hence, not only internal
corporate records, such as ledgers and journal entries, but also records of
corporate transactions with third parties, such as agreements with thirdparty vendors, are covered. The FCPA’s recordkeeping provision also
includes minutes of board of director meetings and board resolutions,
but would not encompass every memorandum or note taken by an
employee relating to any business matter.
Furthermore, transactions must be accurately recorded “in
reasonable detail.” The FCPA defines “reasonable detail” to mean “such
level of detail . . . as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of
their own affairs.”164 This means that records should include any
160.
161.

15 U.S.C. § 78M(b)(2)(A).
Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 580; Deming, supra note 48, at 483-90;
DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 14-17
(2d ed. 1999).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(37).
163. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 748-49 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) & (b)(7); SEC v. Battenberg, No. 06-14891, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88255, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2011).
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information tending to alert the SEC to any impropriety. For example,
external and internal auditors should look for cash payments, payments
to anonymous or numbered bank accounts, checks written to “bearer” or
“cash” and misleading or fake documentation serving as a cover for
fictitious sales, purchases, loans or other transactions.
All public companies that file Form 10-K reports must observe the
accounting provisions regardless of whether they engage in foreign
operations.165 Officers, directors, employees and stockholders or agents
of a publicly traded firm are also subject to the accounting provisions.
Individuals and non-publicly traded entities can be subject to the
accounting provisions to the extent they are accomplices to statutory
violations. The accounting provisions apply to various types of
corporate activities, even wholly domestic activities and the manner in
which those activities or transactions are reflected in corporate
accounting records.166
A U.S. publicly traded firm (an “issuer”) must ensure that any
majority-owned foreign subsidiary adheres to the accounting provisions.
For example, in 2006, the SEC brought an action against Schnitzer Steel
Industries, Inc.167 Allegedly, Schnitzer’s wholly owned subsidiaries, SSI
International Far East Ltd. and SSI International, Inc., made improper
cash payments to managers of scrap metal customers owned, in whole or
in part, by the Chinese government, to induce purchases of Schnitzer’s
scrap metal.168 “In order to conceal the improper payments, Schnitzer
falsely described those payments to foreign officials as ‘sales
commissions,’ ‘commissions to the customer,’ ‘refunds,’ or ‘rebates’ in
Schnitzer’s books and records.”169 Schnitzer paid a $7.7 million civil
penalty for violation of both the anti-bribery and accounting/internal
control provisions of the FCPA.170
165. Said FCPA provisions are part of the federal securities laws which apply to all
U.S. publicly traded firms (with or without foreign business activity). The accounting
and internal control provisions have a broader reach than improper payments to foreign
officials and apply to all aspects of practices relating to the preparation of financial
statements of an entity. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 579; Deming, supra note 48,
at 482; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 348 (5th ed. 2005).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), (b)(6).
166. See United States v. CropGrowers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 356-57 (D.D.C.
1997).
167. In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-54606, at 1
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id. at 4-8.
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A parent issuer may also be held responsible in some cases of less
than 50% ownership.171 When an issuer does not have an ownership
interest greater than 50%, it must “proceed in good faith to use its
influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer’s circumstances, to
cause [the affiliate] to devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls” consistent with the accounting provisions.172 Good
faith efforts should “include the relative degree of the issuer’s ownership
of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the
business operations of the country in which such firm is located.”173
Other relevant factors in assessing good faith include the extent to which
the issuer has the opportunity to obtain access to books and records, and
the extent to which the issuer can influence a subsidiary’s or other
partner’s actions by other means.174 The SEC applies practical tests in its
determination of whether an issuer controls a foreign subsidiary. An
issuer’s duty to influence a foreign subsidiary’s behavior increases
directly with the degree to which it can exercise control over the
subsidiary.
2. Internal Controls
The FCPA itself does not define “internal accounting controls.” In
general, internal controls are the various policies, procedures, and
processes by which a business is managed effectively and efficiently.
One federal appellate court defined “internal accounting controls” as the
“mechanism by which companies monitor their accounting system (their
individualized method of processing transactions) for errors and
irregularities in order to safeguard company assets and ensure that
records are sufficiently reliable.”175
The FCPA requires publicly traded firms to design and maintain a
system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that:

171. See Deming, supra note 48, at 474. The SEC took enforcement action against
an issuer that had less than 50% control in SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:02CV-0113
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr173
10.htm.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2006).
173. Id.
174. See Witten et al., supra note 93, at 701.
175. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 672 n.14 (3d Cir. 2002).
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(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as
necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;
and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken
176
with respect to any differences . . . .

The SEC does not mandate any specific internal controls. The SEC
articulates broad goals that controls should achieve and leaves the
implementation of specific policies and procedures to issuers. Several
factors are considered in the determination of whether a system of
internal controls is reasonable under the circumstances: (1) the role of
the board of directors; (2) communication of corporate procedures; (3)
assignment of authority and responsibility; (4) competence and integrity
of personnel; (5) accountability for performance and compliance with
policies and procedures; and (6) objectivity and effectiveness of the
internal audit function.177 The failure to establish an audit committee
may violate the FCPA. A public firm may also violate the law if it has
no controls for a particular activity such as fund transfers outside the
country or the making of political contributions.
3. Enforcement of Accounting and Internal Control Provisions
Both the SEC and DOJ have enforced the FCPA’s accounting and
recordkeeping provisions, with the SEC often taking the lead. In
addition, the accounting provisions have been used to support charges
under the anti-bribery provisions. Prosecution under the anti-bribery
provisions is more difficult because evidence is obtained in a foreign
setting.178
In an anti-bribery case, one of the most difficult elements is tracing
funds through offshore corporations and bank accounts, the beneficial
ownership of which can be extremely costly to determine.179 The
176.
177.
178.
179.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 581.
Deming, supra note 48, at 492.
Suppose that to prove a case against a bribe-giver the U.S. must prove that
payments to a certain Caribbean corporation secretly benefited the procurement
minister in the foreign nation concerned. Proving the link between the minister and the
company can be difficult and expensive. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing:
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cooperation of authorities in foreign nations is vital. If law enforcement
in a given country fails to cooperate then the U.S. government must
prove the case here without subpoena and search powers where the bribe
may have occurred.180
For a FCPA case involving the accounting provisions, no need
exists to prove “corrupt intent,” whether a “foreign official” was
involved or to demonstrate whether a promise, offer or payment was
made to “obtain or retain business” or “secure an improper
advantage.”181 The elements of an accounting violation are limited to
whether the business record is covered by the accounting provisions,
whether the conduct was willful, and whether the record was accurate in
reasonable detail.182
For example, in July 2010, the SEC filed books and records, and
internal controls charges against General Electric and two GE
subsidiaries—Ionics, Inc. and Amersham PLC.183 The SEC alleged that
the two subsidiaries made $3.6 million in illegal kickback payments to
the Iraqi Health Ministry, that GE and the two subsidiaries failed to
maintain adequate systems of internal controls to detect and prevent the
payments and that the accounting for the transactions failed to properly
record the nature of the payments.184 GE agreed to pay $23.4 million to
settle the charges.185
In another case, the SEC entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement (“DPA”) with Tenaris S.A. concerning allegations that the
steel pipe product manufacturer bribed Uzbekistan officials to supply oil
and natural gas pipelines.186 In response to SEC findings, Tenaris
reviewed its compliance practices.187 Generally, businesses can improve
Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J.
INT’L. L. 169, 187 (2006).
180. Id.
181. Deming, supra note 48, at 482, 492.
182. United States v. Wilson, No. 01 CR. 53 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572,
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001).
183. SEC v. Gen. Elec. Co., Exchange Act Release, No. 3159, CA No. 1:10-CV01258 (D.D.C. July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases
/2010/lr21602.htm.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, SEC NEWS DIGEST, 1 (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/digest
/2011/dig051711.htm.
187. Id.
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their internal controls through due diligence requirements related to the
retention and payment of agents and FCPA training.
4. Vicarious Liability Under the Accounting and Internal Control
Provisions
a. Criminal Liability
An individual or entity can be held vicariously liable for the
conduct of a third party when the latter is acting for or on behalf of the
individual. Even if a third party is not subject to the accounting and
internal control provisions, an individual or entity may become subject
to vicarious liability if that individual or entity directs, authorizes or
ratifies prohibited conduct.188 The key determinant is whether the agent
is acting within the scope of express, implied or apparent authority.189
Improper entries in an entity’s books and records often result when
improper payments are made or funneled to a foreign official through a
foreign agent.190 A parent firm probably confronts an accounting/internal
controls violation despite that an improper accounting entry is made on
the books of a remote subsidiary or affiliate.191 Also, an
accounting/internal controls charge may be pressed against a parent
based on the notion that had appropriate internal controls been enforced
any improper payment would not have happened.192
For criminal liability to attach for the conduct of third parties, a
publicly traded firm must possess knowledge that the third party has
circumvented or intends to violate the accounting provisions. Deliberate
188.
189.

Deming, supra note 48, at 476.
United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983); see also
United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 1981).
190. Koehler, supra note 95, at 402.
191. Id.
192. Id. For example, Halliburton was held liable under the accounting and internal
control provisions based on the conduct of agents used by a joint venture in which
Halliburton participated indirectly through subsidiaries. Specifically, Halliburton was
held liable based on the allegation that it exercised control over subsidiaries that were
involved in the joint venture. The SEC complaint contended that: (1) Kellogg, Brown,
and Root’s (“KBR”) board of directors consisted solely of senior Halliburton officials;
(2) senior Halliburton officials hired and replaced KBR’s senior officials, set
compensation and established performance goals; (3) Halliburton consolidated KBR’s
financial statements; and (4) KBR’s Halliburton officials were aware of the joint
venture’s use of a U.K. agent. Complaint at 30, SEC v. Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-399
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009).
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ignorance or conscious disregard can satisfy the knowledge
requirement.193 Conscious acquiescence to an authorized act or acts may
amount to authorization of those acts.194 Knowledge may reside with one
person not necessarily a senior officer,195 or may be the collective
knowledge of various employees acting within the scope of
employment. 196
Vicarious criminal liability can also emanate from an entity or
individual being an accomplice under the aiding and abetting statute.197
Criminal liability based on aiding and abetting requires intent that an
offense be committed plus conduct that aids or abets a violation.198 Also,
a conspiracy (i.e., an agreement) of two or more entities and/or
individuals to violate the accounting and/or internal control provisions
may serve as the basis for a federal conspiracy offense.199 The statute
requires the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.200 The overt act need not be unlawful, so long as it
contributes to an unlawful end. A relatively minor act, such as a phone
call, or a series of e-mails, can serve as an overt act. The overt act is
attributable to all co-conspirators who are members at the time the act is
committed or those who join later.201
Moreover, under the Pinkerton rule, a defendant may be vicariously
liable for a substantive offense committed by another member of the

193. United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 1986); see also United
States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984).
194. Brown, supra note 78, at 32-33.
195. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1982).
196. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.”).
198. United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 371. This statute makes it a crime for “two or more persons to
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose . . . .” Id.
200. United States v. Quinn, 403 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2005). An overt act is
an “outward act done in pursuance of the crime and in manifestation of an intent or
design, looking toward the accomplishment of the crime.” Chavez v. United States, 275
F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1960).
201. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997).
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conspiracy.202 A co-conspirator may be convicted of an offense (other
than conspiracy) without knowledge of or participation in the offense.203
Pinkerton liability is not rare in white collar crime cases such as FCPA
violations.
b. Civil Liability
A civil action under the accounting and internal control provisions
does not require knowledge.204 An entity can be held strictly liable for
the actions taken by an officer, director, employee, shareholder or agent
acting on behalf of the issuer.205 When an issuer has an interest greater
than 50%, strict liability applies.206 When an entity has less than a 50%
interest, strict vicarious liability attaches when it is shown that the entity
has not proceeded “in good faith to use its influence, to the extent
reasonable under the . . . circumstances, to cause such domestic or
foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal controls
consistent” with those provisions.207
Another theory of vicarious liability used by the SEC is “control
person” liability under §20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.208
This legal approach requires that the plaintiff establish a primary FCPA
violation by the controlled person entity, as well as control of the
primary violator.209 Control of a primary violator may be shown by
ownership of voting securities, contract, ability to influence
management policies or otherwise.210 Once a prima facie violation of

202. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 651 (1946). In that case,
Daniel Pinkerton, the defendant, was convicted of tax fraud actually committed by his
brother. Daniel was in jail at the time and did not participate in or even know of the
offenses. Daniel’s liability was upheld on the theory that co-conspirators are
responsible for each other’s acts.
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., In re Int’l. Bus. Machs. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 34-43761
(Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-43761.htm;
Witten et al., supra note 93, at 702; Deming, supra note 48, at 480.
205. See id.
206. Deming, supra note 48, at 480; Witten et al., supra note 93, at 701; Giudice,
supra note 142, at 353.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2006).
208. Id. § 78t(a); see, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir.
1996).
209. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1472.
210. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009).
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§20(a) is established the burden of proof shifts to the control person or
entity to demonstrate actions taken in good faith.211
c. FCPA Penalties
Criminal and civil penalties can result from violation of the FCPA.
A company that violates the anti-bribery provisions may be fined up to
$2 million per offense and be subject to civil penalties of $100,000 per
violation.212 An individual may be fined up to $100,000 per violation
and imprisoned for five years for a willful violation and may be subject
to civil penalties of $10,000 per violation.213 Alternatively, fines can be
levied up to $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for a corporation,
or twice the gross gain from unlawful activity, whichever is greater.214
A company that knowingly commits a violation of the accounting
provisions may be fined up to $25 million and face civil penalties of up
to $500,000.215 An individual may be fined $5 million, imprisoned for
20 years, and face up to $100,000 in civil penalties.216 Other penalties
for accounting provision violations include SEC injunctive actions, civil
penalty actions, equitable remedies, such as “disgorgement” of profits
and administrative proceedings.
XII.

FCPA COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS

The main reasons for a FCPA compliance program are to prevent
violations prior to their occurrence, quickly detect any violations and
mitigate the penalties in the event a violation occurs. The DOJ and SEC
have indicated that the existence of a compliance program is a
significant factor taken into account in deciding whether to bring
charges, what charges to bring and what penalties to impose.217 The
failure to establish a FCPA compliance program may be seen as

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Marbury Mgmt. Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1), 78dd-3(e)(1), 78ff(c)(1)-(2) (2006).
Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2), 78dd-3(e)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3571.
Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78ff(a).
Id. §§ 78ff(a).
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components, United States Attorneys (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
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evidence of a lack of internal controls that might in and of itself be a
violation of the accounting provisions.218
U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and several FCPA settlement
agreements outline criteria by which a compliance program is evaluated
by the SEC and DOJ.219 Although these criteria are not legally binding,
they provide solid guidance on the contents of an effective FCPA
compliance program. These criteria include:

218.
219.



Clearly stated corporate policy against violations of the
FCPA and establishment of compliance standards and
procedures that are reasonably capable of diminishing the
prospect of violations;



Assignment of the responsibility for compliance oversight
to appropriate senior corporate officials who report directly
to the audit or compliance committee of the Board of
Directors;



Identification of high-risk countries or businesses and
performance of periodic anti-bribery audits of operations in
such countries;



Regular FCPA training for officers and employees
involved in foreign projects and for agents, consultants, and
subcontractors;



Adoption and implementation of accounting and internal
controls to ensure compliance with the accounting and
recordkeeping provisions of the FCPA;



Establishment of a reporting system for officers,
employees, agents, consultants, joint venture partners, and
distributors to report suspected criminal conduct without
fear of reprisal; and



Adoption and implementation of procedures to ensure that
the company’s agents, consultants, joint venture partners,

See Witten et al., supra note 93.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENT TO 2010 GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8B2.1 (2010); Plea Agreement, United States v. Titan Corp., No. 05CR0314, at 4-5
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
titan-corp/03-01-05titan-plea.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. DPC Tianjin Ltd.,
No. CR 05-482, at 4-5 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/dpc-tianjin/5-19-05dpc-tianjin-plea-agree.pdf.
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and distributors are not likely to engage in improper
220
activities.

Conducting a due diligence investigation of agents, partners or
consultants of a firm that could potentially violate the FCPA is one way
to reduce the risk of FCPA violations. Company procedures should
require that a due diligence process be undertaken before the firm enters
into a relationship with a foreign agent, representative or business
partner. FCPA due diligence concerning consultants, partners or agents
should include requirements that the company:

220.



determine the competence, expertise, and reputation of the
party, as well as the party’s contacts with important
government decision-makers. The party’s experience,
education, former governmental or military service, family
and business relationships, and reputation for honesty are
all important areas of inquiry;



evaluate whether the proposed compensation to be paid in
exchange for the services rendered or products delivered is
reasonable. “Success fees” deserve special scrutiny;



contact local counsel to ensure that they proposed
arrangement will not violate local law . . . and, depending
on the circumstances, FCPA counsel;



insert standard representations and warranties concerning
compliance with the FCPA;



assure the maintenance of accurate books and records by
the consultant, [agent] or partner;



apply a common sense “smell” test to the proposed
arrangement; and



after [due] diligence is completed, prepare a file
memorandum to record the [due] diligence steps taken.221

Witten et al., supra note 93, at 724-26.

2012]

TAKING A BITE OUT OF BRIBERY

585

Different sources to help ascertain a consultant’s or agent’s
reputation, expertise and relationships include auditing firms, law firms,
the relevant U.S. Embassy, the Commerce Department, the State
Department, financial institutions and possibly private investigations.222
Companies using foreign consultants, agents, or representatives
should place protective covenants in consultancy, partnership or agency
agreements, such as:


The parties’ confirmation of an awareness of the terms of
the FCPA;



An agreement not to violate the FCPA;



An agreement not to pay money or anything of value to
foreign officials;



A representation that the party is not an employer, officer,
or agent of a foreign government or candidate for public
office, and an agreement that the U.S. party will be advised
if the partner or consultant assumes the position of a
government official during the relationship;



An agreement that the party will keep accurate books and
records;



A covenant that will allow the U.S. firm to review or audit
all the books and records of the consultant or agent relating
to its activities for the benefit of the U.S. firm; and
An agreement that payments under any contract will be
made only by check or wire transfer to an account in the
name of the contracting party located in the host country.223



All compliance efforts should be documented carefully to permit
the U.S. firm to prove later that it implemented a rigorous program in
practice.
221. O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK
(4th ed. 2003).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 12-13.
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It is critical to have the appropriate “tone from the top” for FCPA
compliance. The entity’s FCPA policies and procedures must be
endorsed and sponsored by both senior and mid-level management. The
latter are important because they actually conduct the firm’s daily
business operations. Each entity should also conduct periodic reviews of
its FCPA compliance program with a view toward remedial action so
that any missteps are not repeated. Continuous monitoring for FCPA
compliance should be linked to other anti-fraud efforts because a
relationship exists between the way bribery is conducted and the types
of schemes used for fraud.224
CONCLUSION
The FCPA now plays a pivotal role in addressing U.S. firms’
involvement in bribery of foreign public officials and requiring that
publicly traded firms meet certain standards regarding internal controls
and accounting practices, books and records. The SEC and DOJ have
increased enforcement of the FCPA during the last few years to such an
extent that many publicly traded firms have FCPA audits performed by
internal and/or external auditors.
The anti-bribery provisions criminalize the payment or offer of
payment either directly or indirectly, of money or anything of value to
an official of a foreign government, public international organization,
foreign political party or candidate for public office, made with corrupt
intent to obtain or retain business or secure an improper advantage. The
anti-bribery provisions are much broader than the accounting provisions.
All public companies that file Form 10-K reports must observe the
accounting provisions regardless of whether they engage in foreign
operations. Officers, directors, employees, and stockholders or agents of
a public company, acting on the latter’s behalf, are subject to the
accounting provisions. The latter are aimed at prohibiting the
establishment of off-the-books accounts, making of off-the-books
transactions, recording of non-existent expenditures and the use of false
documentation for concealing bribery activities.
The FCPA also requires publicly traded firms to design and
maintain a system of internal controls. Although the SEC does not
mandate any specific controls, it does articulate broad goals that controls
should achieve while leaving the implementation of specific policies and
224.

Taylor, supra note 10, at 23.
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procedures to issuers. FCPA provisions related to internal controls
provide many ways for the SEC to initiate legal proceedings.
Serious criminal and civil sanctions can result from FCPA
violations. During the last decade, numerous firms have paid fines and
penalties totaling billions of dollars and individuals have been sentenced
to prison. A firm’s cooperation is considered by the government in
deciding whether to bring criminal charges and what penalties to seek.
FCPA compliance programs are a key means to demonstrate
cooperation in the event of a violation. A firm’s board of directors and
senior management should establish a compliance culture through
preventative training and ongoing monitoring. Specific audits focused
on the FCPA have become more common in many firms. Also, in an
acquisition setting, it is possible for an acquirer to be held liable if a
seller’s FCPA violations are not uncovered.
In sum, the FCPA and its enhanced enforcement represent an
important step towards combating bribery in international business
transactions and promoting more transparent financial reporting.
Increased enforcement of the FCPA should result in a reduction of the
level of corruption and fraud. Only then will the global marketplace
become a level playing field that embraces the principles of fairness and
transparency and promotes confidence in the arena in which
international and securities transactions occur.
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Table 1 – Page 1 of 2
SUMMARY DATA ON FCPA VIOLATIONS—2000-2009
Year
Total number of cases filed
Number of cases against corporations
Of which are foreign corporations
Number of cases against Individuals
Cases disposed
Cases pending at end of year
Cases Filed by SEC
Number of cases
Total value of SEC sanctions (in million $)a
Average sanction (in million $)
a

Total value of business obtained (in million $)

Average value of business obtained (in million $)
Total bribe paid (in million $)a
Average bribe amount (in million $)
Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained
Cases Filed by DOJ
Number of cases
Total value of DOJ sanctions (in million $)a
Average sanction (in million $)
a

Total value of business obtained (in million $)

Average value of business obtained (in million $)
Total bribe paid (in million $)a
Average bribe amount (in million $)
Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained

2009
67
17
1
50
32
35

2008
47
30
17
17
43
4

2007
47
29
6
18
46
1

2006
18
7
3
11
18
0

2005
14
8
1
6
14
0

15
209.489(13)

15
406.667(12)

21
86.351(18)

11
68.485(7)

5
35.095(5)

16.114

33.889

4.797

9.783

7.019

6037.370(7)

10759.706(8)

2608.965(13)

945.719(8)

151.010(3)

862.481

1344.963

200.69

118.215

50.337

86.095(18)
4.783
0.1935

14.381(11)
1.307
0.0133

5.622(5)
1.124
0.0213

182.311(6)
30.385
0.1478

1616.148(13)
124.319
0.2721

52
438.908(11)

32
508.889(16)

26
91.132(18)

7
8.284(6)

9
17.458(7)

39.901

31.805

5.063

3.047

2.4941

6542.504(29)

9582.188(21)

5816.416(17)

751.590(5)

112.055(3)

225.604

456.295

342.142

150.318

37.352

217.280(26)

1168.823(25)

383.168(20)

20.200(7)

914.462(9)

8.357

46.753

19.158

2.886

101.607

0.1359

0.2222

0.1077

0.0462

0.0296

Note: a Figures in parentheses indicate the number of cases for which data was available. NA – data not available
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Table 1 – Page 2 of 2
SUMMARY DATA ON FCPA VIOLATIONS—2000-2009
Year
Total number of cases filed
Number of cases against corporations
Of which are foreign corporations
Number of cases against Individuals
Cases disposed
Cases pending at end of year

2004
8
6
3
2
8
0

2003
6
0
0
6
5
1

2002
9
3
1
6
7
2

2001
15
4
0
11
15
0

2000
1
1
0
0
1
0

3
16.426(2)

1
NA

5
.661(3)

7
0.175(2)

1
NA
NA

8.213

NA

0.22

0.087

Total value of business obtained (in million $)a

NA

NA

NA

6.457(3)

NA

Average value of business obtained (in million $)

NA

NA

NA

2.152

NA

0.186(2)
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

11.960(3)
3.987
NA

0.669(7)
0.0956
0.1504

NA
NA
NA

5
6.0518(2)

5
NA

4
2.406(3)

8
0.063(3)

0
NA

3.025

NA

0.802

0.021

NA

450.300(4)

1101.000(2)

2.270(3)

9.0975(4)

NA

Average value of business obtained (in million $)

112.575

NA

0.756

2.275

NA

Total bribe paid (in million $)a

2.604(4)

1011.000(5)

0.757(4)

1.595(4)

NA

0.651

202.2

0.189

0.399

NA

0.0101

NA

0.131

0.2896

NA

Cases Filed by SEC
Number of cases
Total value of SEC sanctions (in million $)a
Average sanction (in million $)

Total bribe paid (in million $)a
Average bribe amount (in million $)
Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained
Cases Filed by DOJ
Number of cases
Total value of DOJ sanctions (in million $)a
Average sanction (in million $)
Total value of business obtained (in million $)a

Average bribe amount (in million $)
Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained

Note: a Figures in parentheses indicate the number of cases for which data was available. NA – data not available

